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Abstract-Revision of the mathematical formalism of Newtonian dynamics suggests that its de 
terminism and reversibility result from additional mathematical restrictions which are not consistent 
with the physical nature of motions. The removal of these restrictions, and a new model for Newtonian 
dynamics, as well as its applications to modelling neural intelligence are discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Classical dynamics describes processes in which the future can be derived from the past, and 
the past can be traced from the future by time inversion, t -+ -t. Because of such determinism 
and reversibility, classical dynamics becomes fully predictable, and therefore, it cannot explain 
the emergence of new dynamical patterns in nature in the same way in which nonequilibrium 
thermodynamics does. This major flaw in classical dynamics has attracted the attention of many 
outstanding scientists [I]. 
Recent advances in nonlinear dynamics raised expectations that chaos is the key to unpre- 
dictability. However, the discovery of chaos actually raised more questions than answers. Indeed, 
how can fully deterministic dynamical equations with small uncertainties in initial conditions 
produce random solutions with stable probabilistic structure? And how can this structure be 
predicted? Are chaotic motions consistent with the assumptions of differentiability? In this pa- 
per, we discuss that. The line of our argumentations is as follows. Chaos is a product of two 
conflicting phenomena: dissipation and instability. But instability is an attribute of a mathe- 
matical model rather than of a physical phenomenon. It is related to a certain class of functions. 
As shown in [2], it is possible to find such a (noninertial) frame of reference in which chaos is 
eliminated; but the price for that is the appearance of nonelementary (multivalued) functions. 
Hence, in our view, chaos results from a discrepancy between physical phenomena and the class 
of functions in which they are described. The same line of argumentation elucidates another 
discrepancy between mathematical formalism and physical reality: the Lipschitz condition which 
provides uniqueness of solutions, leads to infinite time of approaching equilibria. As shown in [S], 
violation of the Lipschitz condition at equilibria eliminates this idealization without any incon- 
sistency with physical laws. But as a “side-effect,” it leads to irreversibility and unpredictability 
of Newtonian dynamics. In this paper, these new concepts associated with unpredictability in 
classical dynamics and their applications to modelling neural intelligence will be discussed. 
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2. PREDICTION OF CHAOS 
Formally, chaos is caused by instability of trajectories (orbital instability). If the velocity of 
a particle is decomposed as v’ = v?, (? is the unit vector along the trajectory), then orbital 
instabilities are identified with instabilities of 7’. In other words, the orbital instability leads 
only to redistributions of the energy between different coordinates, and it can be associated with 
an ignorable variable which does not contribute into kinetic energy. That is why the orbital 
instability may not lead to classical attractors and chaos can emerge. 
But then two arguments can be brought up. First, from the mechanical viewpoint, stability 
is not an invariant of motion: it depends upon the frame of reference. For instance, the same 
inviscid flow can be stable in an Eulerian representation and unstable in a Lagranian one [4] or 
in a frame of reference moving with the streamlines [5]. This leads to the following question. 
Is it possible to find such a (noninertial) frame of reference in which the inertia forces would 
stabilize the motion, i.e., they would eliminate all the positive Lyapunov exponents? The answer 
to that question was given by Zak [a]. He introduced a specially selected rapidly oscillating 
frame of reference in which the originally chaotic motion was stabilized by inertia forces coupled 
with the motion itself. In other words, he found a frame of reference which provides the best 
“view” of the motion. However, there was a certain price paid for this representation: the 
component of the solution corresponding to the transport motion with the frame of reference 
contained the function sin wt, w + co which is actually multivalued. Indeed, for any arbitrarily 
small interval At, there always exists such a large frequency w > n/27r that within this interval 
the function runs through all its values. This means that in order to eliminate chaos, one has 
to enlarge the class of smooth functions by introducing nondifferentiable functions, and that 
leads us to the second question. Is chaos an invariant of motion or is it an attribute of a 
mathematical model? From the mathematical viewpoint, the concept of stability is related to 
a certain class of function, or a type of space, and therefore, the same solution can be stable 
in one space and unstable in another depending upon the “distance” between two solutions. 
Hence, the occurrence of chaos in the description of mechanical motions means only that these 
motions cannot be properly described by smooth functions if the scale of observations is limited. 
These arguments can be linked to Godel’s incompleteness theorem [6], and Richardson’s [7] proof 
that the theory of elementary functions in classical analysis is undecidable [8]. Indeed, classical 
dynamics, in addition to Newton’s laws, is based upon certain assumptions of a pure mathematical 
nature. They restrict the class of functions that describes the motions, to functions of sufficient 
smoothness. Such artificial limitations which do not follow from axioms of mechanics may become 
inconsistent with the physical nature of motions. As shown by Zak [9], these inconsistencies lead 
to instabilities (in the class of smooth functions) of equations which govern turbulent and chaotic 
motions. 
The first step toward the enlarging of the class of functions for modelling turbulence was 
made by 0. Reynolds (1895) who decomposed the velocity field into the mean and pulsating 
components, and actually introduced a multivalued velocity field. However, this decomposition 
brought new unknowns without additional governing equations, and that created a %losure” 
problem. In 1986, Zak [lO,ll] has shown that the Reynolds equations can be obtained by referring 
the Navier-Stokes equations to a rapidly oscillating frame of reference, while the Reynolds stresses 
represent the contribution of inertia forces. From these viewpoints, the “closure” has the same 
status as “proof’ of Euclid’s parallel postulate, since the motion of the frame of reference can be 
chosen arbitrarily. In other words, the “closure” of the Reynolds equations represents a case of 
undecidability in classical mechanics. However, based upon the interpretation of the Reynolds 
stresses as inertia forces, it is reasonable to choose the motion of the frame of reference such that 
the inertia forces eliminate the original instability. In other words, the enlarged class of functions 
should be selected such that the solution to the original problem in that class of functions will not 
possess an exponential sensitivity to changes in initial conditions. This stabilization principle has 
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been formulated and applied to chaotic and turbulent motions by Zak [2,10-121. As shown there, 
the motions which are chaotic (or turbulent) in the original frame of reference can be represented 
as a sum of the “mean” motion and rapid fluctuations, while both components are uniquely 
defined. It is worth emphasizing that the amplitude of velocity fluctuation is proportional to 
the degree of the original instability, and therefore, the rapid fluctuations can be associated with 
the measure of the uncertainty in the description of the motion. It should be noticed that both 
“mean” and ‘%uctuation” components representing the originally chaotic motion are stable, i.e., 
they are not sensitive to changes of initial conditions, and are fully reproducible. 
Thus, chaos as a supersensitivity to initial conditions can be eliminated by describing the 
originally chaotic motion in an enlarged class of functions, for instance, by performing a Reynolds- 
type transformation and applying the stabilization principle. 
In this section, we will illustrate prediction of the probabilistic structure of the Lorentz attractor 
by using the stabilization principle. 
Applying the Reynolds transformation to the Lorentz attractor: 
i= --(Tx+cTy, Ij = -xz + TX - y, i = xy - bz, (1) 
one obtains 
2 = -al fag, jj=rz-g-~~-~, t= -b.z+xy+mj, (2) 
where %,k, z are the mean values of x, y, and z, while D and ?5j are double correlations repre- 
senting the Reynolds “stresses.” 
As extra-variables, these double correlations must be found from the condition that they sup- 
press the positive Lyapunov exponent down to zero. In this case, both the mean and the double- 
correlations components of the motion will be represented by periodic attractors, i.e., in a fully 
deterministic way. 
Numerical implementation of this strategy performed for cr = 10, r = 28, and b = S/3 leads 
to the following results. Figure 1 represents the original chaotic attractor as a solution to (1). 
In Figure 2, this attractor is decomposed into two deterministic (periodic) motions: the mean 
motion (Figure 2a) and the double correlations, i.e., the Reynold’s stresses (Figure 2b,c). In order 
to find all the double correlations, one should exploit the system for triple-correlations which can 
be obtained in a straight-forward way from (1). In this system, all the triple-correlations, as 
extra-variables, must be found from stabilization principle in a similar way. By continuing this 
process, one can find the probabilistic structure of the solution to the Lorentz equations (1) to a 
required accuracy. 
Y 
Figure 1. 2 vs. y plot for l,OOO,OOO points sampled at 1000 points 
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Figure 2~. TE: Double correlations. Plot over time (8000 points). 
Hence, from a formal mathematical point of view, the occurrence of chaos in description of 
mechanical motions means only that these motions cannot be properly described by smooth 
functions if the scale of observation is finite. 
3. TERMINAL MODEL OF NEWTONIAN DYNAMICS 
Turning back to our original problem of unpredictability in classical dynamics, one might 
ask now: are there any additional mathematical restrictions in classical dynamics which are 
unnecessary from a physical viewpoint? As shown in [3], there are such restrictions. One of them 
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is the Lipschitz condition which requires that all the derivatives 1 $-$-I of a dynamical system 
Pi = f(Xi,. . . , z,) are bounded. 
This condition allows one to describe the Newtonian dynamics within the mathematical frame- 
work of classical theory of differential equations which guarantees its reversibility and predictabil- 
ity. That, in turn, leads to such effects as infinite time of approaching an attractor, infinite time 
for escape of a repeller if changes in initial conditions are infinitesimal, untractability of two 
trajectories which originally are “very close,” but diverge exponentially, etc. 
Hence, there are a variety of phenomena whose explanations cannot be based directly upon the 
classical dynamics: in addition, they require some “words” about a scale of observation, “very 
close” trajectories, etc. 
Turning to governing equations of classical dynamics: 
d dL dL dR 
--=--:> 
dt a& aqi hi 
i=1,2 ,,.., 72, (3) 
where L is the Lagrangian, qi, Qi are the generalized coordinates and velocities, and R is the 
dissipation function, one should recall that the structure of R(&, . . . , &) is not prescribed by 
Newton’s laws. Some additional assumptions are to be made in order to define it. The “natural” 
assumption (which has been never challenged) is that these functions can be expanded in a Taylor 
series with respect to equilibrium states: C& = 0. Obviously, this requires the existence of the 
derivative: I& / < co at & + 0. 




while p is a large odd number. 
By selecting large p, one can make Ic close to 1 so that (4) is almost identical to the classical 
one (when /C = 1) everywhere, excluding a small neighborhood of the equilibrium point 4j = 0, 
while at this point: 
d2R 
I 1 
&Y& -+O” at I& + 0. (6) 
Hence, the Lipschitz condition is violated, the friction force Fi = -$-$f grows sharply at the 
equilibrium point, and then it gradually approaches its “classical” value. This effect can be 
interpreted as a mathematical representation of a jump from static to kinetic friction, when the 
dissipation force does not vanish with the velocity. 
It appears that this “small” difference between friction forces at lc = 1 and Ic < 1 leads to 
fundamental changes in Newtonian dynamics. In order to demonstrate it, we will consider the 
relationship between the total energy E and the dissipation function R: 
i 
cj$f = -(k + l)R. 
z 
Within a small neighborhood of an equilibrium state (where the potential energy can be set zero), 
the energy E and the dissipation function R have the order, respectively: 
E -& R-&‘l at E --t 0. (8) 
Hence, the asympotatical form of (24) can be presented as: 
dE _ AE”+i/z 
dt 
at E + 0, A = const. (9) 
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If A > 0 and k < 1, the equilibrium state E = 0 is an attractor where the Lipschitz condition 
((dfi/dE] + 00 at E --+ 0) is violated. Such a terminal [13] attractor is approached by the 




dE 2 n E;l-k/% 
nE, AE(k+1/2) = (1 - k)jAj < O”’ 
Obviously, this integral diverges in the classical case k > 1, where t, -+ 00. The motion described 
by (9) has a singular solution E = 0 and a regular solution: 




In a finite time, the motion can reach the equilibrium and switch to the singular solution E = 0, 
and this switch is irreversible. 
As is well known from dynamics of nonconservative systems, dissipative forces can destabilize 
the motion when they feed the external energy into the system (the transmission of energy from 
laminar to turbulent flow in fluid dynamics, or from rotations to oscillations in dynamics of 
flexible systems). In terms of (9), it would mean that A > 0, and the equilibrium state E = 0 
becomes a terminal repeller [13]. 
If the initial condition is infinitely close to this repeller, the transient solution will escape it 
during a finite time period: 
J nEo dE t, = 
2 n E;l-k/2) 
E_O AE(“+‘2) = (1 - k)A =< m’ 
while for a regular repeller, the time would be infinite. 
Expressing (9) in terms of velocity at i = 1, 41 = ‘u, 
ti = Buk, B = const. > 0, 
one arrives at the following solution: 
(10) 
(11) 
As in the case of a terminal attractor, here the motion is also irreversible: the time-backward 
motion obtained by formal time inversion t + -t in (11) is imaginary, since p is an odd number 
(see (5)). 
But in addition to that, terminal repellers possess even more surprising characteristics: the 
solution (11) becomes totally unpredictable. Indeed, two different motions described by the 
solution (11) are possible for “almost the same” (uO = SE + 0, or U, = --c 4 0 at t =-+ 0) 
initial conditions. 
Thus, a terminal repeller represents a vanishingly short, but infinitely powerful “pulse of unpre- 
dictability” which is pumped into the system via terminal dissipative forces. Obviously, failure of 
the uniqueness of the solution here results from the violation of the Lipschitz condition at w = 0. 
As is known from classical dynamics, the combination of stabilizing and destabilizing effects 
can lead to chaos. In order to describe similar effects in dynamics with terminal dissipative forces, 
let us slightly modify (10) assuming that B = B, cos wt. 
Then stabilization and destabilization effects alternate. With the initial condition v -+ 0 at 
t + 0, the exact solution to (10) consists of a regular solution: 
I 
(l/l-k) 
sin wt 1 21 # 0, (12) 
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and a singular solution u = 0. During the first period 0 < t < 7r/2w, the equilibrium point u = 0 
is a terminal repeller. Therefore, within this interval, the motion can follow one of two possible 
trajectories (12) (each with the probability l/2). D uring the next period n/2w < t < 31r/2w, 
the equilibrium point becomes a terminal attractor; the solution approaches it at t = TW and it 
remains motionless until t > 3~/2w. After that the terminal attractor converts into a terminal 
repeller, and the solution escapes again, etc. It is important to notice that each time the system 
escapes the terminal repeller, the solution splits into two symmetric branches, so that there are 2n 
possible scenarios of the oscillations with respect to the center w = 0, while each scenario has the 
probability 2-* (n is the number of cycles). Hence, the motion (12) resembles chaotic oscillations 
known from classical dynamics. It combines random characteristics with the attraction to a 
center. However, in the classical case, the chaos is caused by a supersensitivity to the initial 
conditions, while the uniqueness of the solution for fixed initial conditions is guaranteed. In 
contrast to that, the chaos in the oscillations (12) is caused by the failure of the uniqueness of 
the solution at the equilibrium points, and it has a well-organized probabilistic structure. Since 
the time of approaching the equilibrium point w = 0 by the solution (12) is finite, this type of 
chaos can be called terminal [14-191 or nondeterministic. 
One of the central problems in Newtonian dynamics is to explain how a motion which is 
described by fully deterministic governing equations can be random. Now we are ready to discuss 
it. Let us consider an exponential growth of an “ignorable” variable a: 
a = cq@, o<x<m. 03) 
Obviously, the solution with infinitely close initial condition 
ci=a:+&, E-+0 (14) 
will remain infinitely close to the original one: 
if E --+ 0, t<oo (15) 
during all the bounded time intervals. This means that random solutions can result only from 
random initial conditions when E in (14) is small, but finite rather than infinitesimal. In other 
words, classical dynamics can explain amplifications of random motions, but cannot explain their 
origin. According to a terminal model of Newtonian dynamics, random motions are generated by 
unstable equilibrium states at which dissipation forces do not vanish with velocities, i.e., where 
the Lipschitz condition is violated. It should be recalled that the evolution of these random 
motions amplified by the mechanism of instability, can be predicted by using the stabilization 
principle discussed in the previous section. 
Within the framework of terminal dynamics, formations of new patterns of motion can be 
understood as chains of terminal attractions and repulsions. As demonstrated above, during 
each terminal repulsion the solution splits into two symmetric branches, and the motion can 
follow each of them with equal probability. 
As shown in [3,20,21], such a scenario can be described by a system of differential equations 
with terminal equilibrium points. In contradistinction to stochastic equations, here random- 
ness results from the violation of the uniqueness of the solutions, and therefore, the differential 
operator itself generates random motions. Because of that, terminal dynamics possessed a well- 
organized probabilistic structure, described by the Fokker-Plack-type equation whose coefficients 
are uniquely defined by fully deterministic parameters of the original dynamical system [21,22]. 
At the same time, it should be stressed again that all the new effects of terminal dynamics emerge 
within vanishingly small neighborhoods of equilibrium states which are the only domains where 
the governing equations are different from classical. 
CAMWA 27:9/10-N 
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4. RELEVANCE TO MODELLING NEURAL INTELLIGENCE 
It is a well-established view that human intelligence is associated with a richly interconnected 
brain, and that complexity of the brain performances corresponds to the complexity of the synap- 
tic interconnections rather than to the complexity of each individual neuron. In other words, 
human intelligence, i.e., the ability to learn, memorize, generalize, predict, etc., results from col- 
lective contributions of a large number of simple units. Within the framework of neurodynamics, 
these simple units and synaptic interconnections are represented by neuron potentials I as 
time-dependent variables and constants Tij, respectively: 
ii + xi = IT&), (16) 
j=l 
where a(.) is a sigmoid function. 
As follows from (16), the synaptic interconnections Til couple the differential equations de- 
scribing single neuron performances such that any change in a potential of one neuron causes 
changes of all the others. Therefore, the constraints imposed upon the neurons by the synaptic 
interconnections within the framework of classical dynamics are explicit and fully deterministic. 
However, observations of working insect colonies, social systems, and scientific communities, 
suggest that there are other types of coupling between single brains where the exchanging informa- 
tion is not always consistent, sometimes imperfect, often indirect. In other words, the constraints 
imposed upon the single units of intelligence are implicit and nondeterministic. Nevertheless, in 
spite of imperfect exchange of information, such systems appear to be more “successful,” since 
they are more flexible, more adaptable to environmental changes, and even more “creative.” 
This suggests that the statistical nature of the neural performance is not a side effect resulting 
from an enormous number of neurons and synaptic interconnections, but it is rather a powerful 
tool for information processing. Indeed, human activity is governed by chance rather than by 
strict deterministic laws. For example, the decision making processes are based upon many 
uncertainties coming from the inconsistency of natural phenomena, imperfect information, etc. 
That is why most of the patterns of brain activity to be memorized and recognized are of stochastic 
rather than of deterministic nature. 
Based upon terminal version of Newtonian dynamics, one can introduce the following neural 
net: 
ki = 7.i sin” 
[ 1 e$i(!/i) sin wt, i= 1,2 )..‘) 72, (17) 
where Ic is expressed by (5), yi, CL, w are constant, 
Yi = 2 Tijzj, Ni < 00, (18) 
j=l 
and Tij form a symmetric positive-definite matrix. 
The solution to (17) is nondeterministic: it splits into two branches at each (terminal) equi- 
librium point representing an n-dimensional random walk. The joint probability density f of 
this solution (for w -+ oo) satisfies the n-dimensional Fokker-Planck equation, and it relaxes to a 




where yi is expressed via zi by (18). 
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For instance, a solution to a two-dimensional terminal system describes a two-dimensional 





= f(x + hll, 22 + h22, t) + f(xl - h12,52 - h21) 
+ fh + hl2,x2 - hl) + f(n - hll,x2 + h21) ’ 
(20) 
or by its continuous approximation: 
, 
where 
Dll = 3~4T;~ +a;Tf2), hll = &(G22 - azT12), h2l = &(azT11 + alTl2), 
hl2 = AnG - (a1T22 + azTl2), h22 = *(""T" -Q1G2), (22) 
The fundamental difference between probabilistic properties of terminal dynamics and those of 
stochastic or chaotic differential equations should be emphasized here. Indeed, the randomness of 
stochastic differential equations is caused by random initial conditions, random force or random 
coefficients. In chaotic equations, small (but finite!) random changes of initial conditions are 
amplified by the mechanism of instability. But in both cases, the differential operator itself re- 
mains deterministic. In contradistinction to that, in terminal neurodynamics randomness results 
from the violation of the uniqueness of the solution at equilibrium points, and therefore, the 
differential operator itself generates random solutions, while this randomness can be prescribed 
and controlled. 
5. MODEL OF COLLECTIVE BRAIN 
One of the possible applications of terminal neurodynamics is a model of collective brain. 
The concept of the collective brain has appeared recently as a subject of intensive scientific 
discussions from theological, biological, ecological, social, and mathematical viewpoints [23,24]. 
It can be introduced as a set of simple units of intelligence (say, neurons) which can communicate 
by exchange of information without explicit global control. The objectives of each unit may 
be partly compatible and partly contradictory, i.e., the units can cooperate or compete. The 
exchanging information may be at times inconsistent, often imperfect, nondeterministic, and 
delayed. Nevertheless, observations of working insect colonies, social systems, and scientific 
communities suggest that such collectives of single units appear to be very successful in achieving 
global objectives, as well as in learning, memorizing, generalizing and predicting, due to their 
flexibility, adaptability to environmental changes and creativity. 
In order to capture nondeterministic 
let us turn to (17) with &(yi) = yi, 
&i(t) --) 0: 
ii = yi sin” 
relationships between the units of intelligence, say, neuron, 
and assume that they are driven by infinitesimal inputs 
sinwt +&i(t). (23) 
These inputs can be ignored when &i # 0, or when C& = 0, but the system is stable. However, it 
becomes significant during the instants of instability. The functions &i(t) + 0 can be associated 
with the gradient of a function: 
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However, in contradistinction to classical gradient dynamical systems, the only important part 
of the gradient here is its sign at equilibrium points, i.e., 
sgn z = t, t, -, +, etc., at xi = Xi(m), m=1,2 ,..., etc. (25) 
If, for instance, $$ > 0, the variable xi moves to the neighboring equilibrium point to its left, 
and if $$ < 0, it moves to the neighboring equilibrium point to its right. In both cases, the 
solution to the system (23) is fully deterministic. However, the coupling between the variables is 
“qualitative” rather than quantitative, since it is effective only at discrete (equilibrium) points, 
and only the signs of the interconnection weights are important (see (25)). This means that a 
given function (24) uniquely defines the solution to (23), but a given solution to (23) does not 
define uniquely the driving function (24). 
A solution to (23) becomes probabilistic if 
a4 0 z= ’ (26) 
at least at one of the equilibrium points. That is why we will deal again with the associated 
Fokker-Planck equation describing the evolution of the corresponding joint density function. 
However, now the exact, i.e., the finite-dimensional version of this equation will be preferred. For 
better physical interpretation, we will turn to the two-dimensional model again. As follows from 
the random walk model: 
f (W%t + ;> = qlqzf(Zi + h11, X2 + h22, t) + p1~2f(X1 - h12, X2 - h2l, t) 
(27) 
+ qlpzf(X1 + h2, X2 - hl, t) + qzplf(Xl - hl1, X2 + h21, t), 
in which hij are defined by (22), and pi and qi in (27) stand for the probabilities that xi will 
move from its equilibrium value to the right or to the left, respectively. Obviously, 
For simplicity, we will assume that the function C$ is a quadratic form: 




WijXj = Uj and Xi = WiTIZLj. 
3 
Then after changing variables xi --f ui: 
one finds: 




Hence, (27) becomes nonlinear since the coefficients pi and qi depend upon the unknown func- 
tion f. 
The weakly coupled dynamical system (23) introduced above is based upon the assumption that 
all the values of the gradients (14) are available. In real life, the situation is more sophisticated. 
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Only some of the current values of the variables xi are available, while the rest of them should 
be predicted. Obviously, the predictions must be based upon the previous experience which 
actually is stored in the synaptic interconnections TQ. For instance, the predicted values of a 
variable zi can be represented by its mathematical expectation. Let us assume, for instance, 
that the values xj (j = 1,2,. . . , m) are known, and xi(i = m + 1,. . . , n) are to be predicted. The 
predicted value of xi is 
M 
zi= c Xif(Xi,...,X,). (33) 
2k=-oO 
k=m+l,...,n 
Now the function d, and the components of its gradient can be presented as follows: 
4 = $(x1,. . . rGn,%+1,. . . ,G&), 
w 
7j-g = 94x1,. . . ,xm,%z+1,. . .,%). (34) 
Hence, in contradistinction to (23),(24), the evolution of the dynamical system: 
i.i = 7.i sin” sinwt + E:(P~(x~, . . . , xm, ?&+I,. . . , zn), &o 4 0 (35) 
depends upon the evolution of the probability equation via the predicted values C& (see (33)). In 
order to simplify an n-dimensional version of the probability equation (27), we will assume that 
the neurons xi are spatially organized in such a way that the only close neighbors are correlated, 
i.e., the only nonzero interconnections in (35) are: Tii # 0, and Tii+l # 0, and x,+1 = x1. Then 
instead of (27), one obtains: 
f (xl,...,xn, t + 6) = e[!?i*i+l f(xl> . . . T Xi + hii, xi+1 + h+l,i+l, . . .7 Xn, t) 
i=l 
+P&+lf(xl, . . . ,xi - hi,i+l, x2+1 - h+l,i, . . .T xn~t) 
+ qiPi+lf(xl, ’ . .7 Xx + h,i+l,xi+l - hii,...,xn,t) 
+ 4i+lPif(xl,. . . ,x~-hii,xi+l+hi+l,i,...,x~,t)l, 
(36) 
in which h,j are defined by (22) if the indices 1 and 2 are replaced by i and i + 1, respectively. 
Obviously, the evolution of the probability equation depends upon the evolution of the dynamical 
system (36) via the coefficients pi and qi which are now defined as 
pi=l-qi=P( T us >O) = 2 5 f(x1,..., xm,%z+1,..., %) 
ul=o, ILj=-lX 
j=l,...,#i 
instead of (32). 
Thus, the dynamical system (35) is coupled with its own probability equation, and this is a 
major departure from previously considered dynamical systems. So far it has been assumed that 
all the neurons, or units of intelligence, have the same access to the information flow in a sense 
that the available x~(J’ = 1,2,. . . , m) and the predicted zi(i = m + 1, . . . , n) variables are the 
same for each gradient component z. Such a “coincidence” is not always the case. In real life, 
some of the units are better informed than others. Hence, in general, instead of (35) one arrives 
at the following: 
*i = 7% sin” sinwt + Ez(Pi(xf,. . . , XL, 3kClr.. . , CE~), Eo -+ 0, (37) 
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wherexf,...,xft are the current values of the variables available for the ith neuron. The difference 
between (35) and (37) is significant. Indeed, formally (35) is driven by a gradient cpi, and therefore, 
one can expect a convergence of its solution to a point. In contradistinction to that, equation (37) 
is not a gradient dynamical system, since (pi, generally speaking, cannot be derived from one scalar 
function. Therefore, its solution may converge to global periodic (or aperiodic) oscillations. But 
even if a solution to (37) (or (35)) converges to a “stationary” state cpi = 0, or cpi = 0, it would 
not mean that this state is necessarily a static attractor. Indeed, in case (20) it would mean that 
the predicted variables %i will have zero expectations: 
Pi = 0, (38) 
while the dispersion or higher moments can be nonzero. Actually, this is the “price” paid for re- 
placements of real values by their predictions. Obviously, the more current values of the variables 
are available, the closer the behavior of (35) or (37) to a “true” gradient system. 
One has to recall that the ability to predict is based upon the previous experience of collective 
tasks which is stored in the synaptic interconnections Tij (see (21,23)). In this respect, two 
questions can be asked: how the probabilistic structure, i.e., the synaptic interconnections Tij , 
can be “installed,” in the first place, and how this structure can be improved based upon new 
collective tasks. 
We do not have an answer to the first question, but it seems unlikely that a dynamical system 
can learn this structure starting from scratch. However, if a “skeleton” of such a structure exists, 
then the improvement can be based upon the comparison of predicted and known values. Indeed, 
let us introduce a functional: 
where T is a relatively large period. Obviously, L depends upon the synaptic interconnections 
Tij . 
Since analytical formulation of this dependence is cumbersome, instead of gradient descent 
methodology, one can apply a much simpler approach which is associated with random direction 
descent. Start with some values of Tij, run (37) and (36) and calculate the new value of L = L’. 
Then generate small random perturbations of Tij, run (37) and (36) again, and calculate the 
new value of L = L”. If the performance improves, i.e., if L” < L’, accept the new value L” 
and continue advancing in the same direction as much as possible, i.e., as long as the functional 
decreases. When L(“) > Len-‘), reject the value L(“), and generate another random direction 
starting with Lcnvl). 
This algorithm is attractive by its simplicity and biological plausibility. However, one of the 
most critical limitations is its ineffectiveness for a large number of variables because of the “curse 
of dimensionality.” As the dimension of the problem increases, a randomly selected direction of 
descent more and more deviates from the true gradient [25]. That is why the existence of an initial 
“skeleton” of the TX3 structure is very important. One possible way to introduce such a structure 
is based upon spatial organizations of the neurons, it significantly decreases the dimensionality 
of the problem. 
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